Discrepancies in the official wheels-off time of United 'Flight 175'

An Independent Investigation

In the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) database, it reveals a discrepancy regarding the "wheels-off time" of UAL 175. (This is the moment when the plane lifts off from the runway). The BTS records a wheels-off time of 8:23 a.m., which differs from the "official" narrative wheels-off time, which is 8:14 a.m. The BTS database reveals that the tail number of the airplane that took-off at 8:23 a.m. was N612UA. This was UAL 175. Yet in contradiction we have Air Traffic Control (ATC) communications indicating that UAL 175 took-off at 8:14 a.m. This leaves no proof that the plane that took-off at 8:14 a.m. was tail number N612UA. Some people have tried to suggest this was an information inputting error which created this discrepancy? The take-off at 8:14 a.m. is also confirmed and supported in the ATC Pilot radio transcripts and radar data. This leaves an obvious question to ask. What about the 8:23 a.m. take-off? 

To learn more we need to understand how the information was being generated. The wheels-off time is triggered automatically by a mechanical sensor switcher when the airplane loses contact with the ground. The data is then sent automatically to the airline via the ‘Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System’ (ACARS), and then the airline forwards the data to the BTS on a regular basis. Ostensibly, no human intervention is involved, thus no human failure is possible. The fact that the gate departure of 7:58 a.m. coincides with the "official" narrative suggests that the data is valid.

Interestingly, an eyewitness for the 8:23 a.m. “unofficial” take-off time is a pilot named Steve Miller. He was the First Officer on US Airways 6805, which departed directly after UAL 175. Lynn Spencer, the author of the book “Touching History”, interviewed Miller for her book. Miller meticulously described how he and his Captain Ron Maxwell were waiting for the departure of United Airlines “Flight 175” as they were the next in line. Quoting from the book below:

“On the taxi-out in Boston, they (the pilots of US Airways 6805) waited at the runway's hold-short line, where Miller looked up to watch a United Boeing 767 take off, United Flight 175. The final weight and balance calculations from dispatch came over the ACARS at 8:05, and with that in hand, the crew was ready to fly. Wide-body aircraft produce especially powerful wingtip vortices - horizontal, tornado-like winds off the ends of the wings - which require time to dissipate before other aircraft can take off, so he waited the required three minutes after United 175 departed before he received his take off clearance”.

One must consider, does this suggest that a UAL 175 took-off at 8:14 a.m. and another "UAL 175" took-off at 8:23 a.m. especially when we bear in mind US Airways 6805's First Officer Miller's account, who was next in line behind UAL 175 to take-off from the runway, and also the "official" BTS data with tail number N612UA (which is UAL 175) taking-off at 8:23 a.m.

When cross-referencing the BTS database, it revealed that USA 6805 had a wheels-off time of 8:28 a.m. Miller explicitly described waiting three minutes before getting take-off clearance, adding time for the time span between take-off for clearance and actual wheels-off, indicating UAL 175 must have lifted-off the runway around 8:23-8:24 a.m. which makes it inconceivable that Miller observed an airplane that took-off at 8:14 a.m.

The question that must be considered is. Did Miller see a different United Airlines airplane? This appears unlikely, after searching the BTS database for other United Boeing 767's it returned no results for the relevant time. There is a slim possibility that a non-domestic United Boeing 767 took-off then, because the BTS database only lists domestic flights, however Miller himself says it was UAL 175, so either he overheard the flight number when taxiing out, or for someone like Miller who was frequently flying from Boston Logan (as he says) was familiar with the wide-body planes departing at that time.

UAL 175 was pushed back from the gate at 8:01 a.m. and according to the "official" story, and the BTS record log. However the "wheels-off time" (when it lifted-off the runway) is different. The "official" narrative says it was 8:14 a.m., which is backed by the ATC transcripts. The BTS says 8:23 a.m., which makes a huge nine minutes discrepancy.

The FAA's report has UAL 175 at 19,000 feet at 8:23 a.m. and is visually identified by AAL 11's pilot at 8:35 a.m. The 9/11 Commission Report states that "United 175 pushed back from its gate at 7:58 and departed Boston Logan Airport at 8:14. By 8:33 it had reached its assigned cruising altitude of 31,000 feet. http://www.911commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch1.htm

This document states that UAL 175 "departed" at 8:14 a.m. Reference: FAA report, Executive Summary, Chronology of a Multiple Hijacking Crisis, September 11, 2001, Sept. 17, 2001 [Referenced Chapter 1, The 9/11 Commission Report, "We Have Some Planes," footnotes 40, 41] (page 1 of 3)
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB165/faa5.pdf

A more detailed FAA document that states that UAL 175 began its take-off roll at 8:14 a.m. and that at 8:23 a.m. UAL 175 established radio contact with Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZBW). "Boston, morning, united one-seventy-five out of one-nine (nineteen thousand feet) for two-three-zero” (twenty-three thousand feet).

The document continues that sometime after 8:23 a.m. UAL 175 was instructed to climb to 31,000 feet, and that at 8:40 a.m. UAL 175 radioed that it was at 31,000 feet.

FAA report, Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001, Sept. 17, 2001 [Referenced Chapter 1, the 9/11 Commission Report, "We Have Some Planes," footnote 44]
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB165/faa7.pdf (Page 12 of 59).

Another reason this time is important and has become more apparent, is from reading the (FAA) Report on the Aircraft Accident about AAL 11 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB165/faa6.pdf

At page 3 of 4, the report states that UAL 175 made visual contact with AAL 11 and verified AAL 11's altitude at 8:38 a.m. (12:38 Universal Time). This would not have been possible if UAL 175 left the ground at 8:23 a.m. as the BTS data says, rather than at 8:14 a.m. as the FAA states and the 9/11 Commission say, because UAL 175 would have been 50 miles or more east of AAL 11's reported flight path.

Another interesting note is, New York Center’s air traffic controller, Dave Bottiglia takes over monitoring the flight from Boston Center controller John Hartling. UAL 175 waits nearly 45 seconds to check in with Bottiglia. According to author Lynn Spencer, this is “rather long, and Bottiglia is just about to call the airplane.” But then Captain Victor Saracini, the pilot of UAL 175, makes radio contact, saying, “New York, United 175 heavy.”  Spencer, 2008, pp. 36

Also, UAL 175 stopped transmitting its transponder signal. It is currently flying near the New Jersey-Pennsylvania border, however the transponder is turned-off for only about 30 seconds and then comes back on as a signal that is not designated for any airplane on this day. Then, within the space of a minute, it is changed to another new code, however New York Center’s air traffic computers do not correlate either of these new transponder codes with UAL 175. Consequently, according to an early FAA report, “the secondary radar return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and flight information began to coast and was no longer associated with the primary radar return.” Therefore, while controllers are able “to track the intruder easily, they could not identify it.” 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 21 https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=484625

Thanks for reading and caring!